Decades of work have focused on how instructions and higherorder knowledge shape aversive learning. In recent years, new experimental and analytic strategies including contingency reversals and computational models allow researchers to test interactions and dissociations between instructed knowledge and feedback-driven learning. New work in human and animal models indicates that instructions and higher order knowledge shape both aversive and appetitive learning in most brain systems involved in value-based learning, including the striatum and orbitofrontal cortex. In contrast, findings in human models suggest that the right amygdala continues to respond to aversive reinforcement, irrespective of instruction. I will review evidence from human and animal models and propose paths forward to understand the amygdala's contribution to instructed aversive learning. 
Introduction
Nearly a century of research has focused on Pavlovian classical conditioning, or associative learning, which describes the experiential learning process by which organisms come to predict salient outcomes in the environment. In humans, expectations and emotions are also shaped through verbal instruction, even without firsthand experience. For instance, most humans express caution at crosswalks without error-driven learning, and psychotherapies built on cognitive interventions or exposure suggest that the balance between instruction and experiential learning is critical in affective disorders. In recent years, researchers have applied new strategies to tease apart the contributions of instructions and associative learning and test for interactions in their underlying neural systems. In this review, I discuss these findings and approaches, focusing on instructed fear and reversal learning. I review evidence suggesting that corticostriatal learning circuits update quickly upon instructions during appetitive and aversive learning, while the right amygdala responds preferentially to aversive outcomes themselves. I compare these findings with animal models of higher order influences on reversal learning, focusing on the dynamic interplay between the orbitofrontal cortex and the amygdala. Finally, I outline key questions and gaps in the literature that should be addressed in future research.
Instructions modulate fear-relevant responses in stable environments
Cook and Harris [1] provided the first evidence that instructions can modulate conditioned responses. They measured skin conductance responses (SCRs), a standard assay of the conditioned response in humans, in response to three manipulations (see Figure 1) . First, participants were told that a green light (the conditioned stimulus, or CS) would be followed by a shock, and the light was presented alone (instructed fear, also known as 'threat of shock' or 'anticipatory anxiety'; [2] [3] [4] [5] ). Next, shocks were paired with lights with varying quantities of reinforcement (instructed learning [6, 7] ). Finally, participants were informed that shocks would no longer be delivered (instructed extinction [8] [9] [10] [11] ). Participants exhibited SCRs in response to the green light upon instruction, showed no additional changes based on the number of subsequent reinforcements, and extinguished SCRs immediately when told they would no longer be shocked. This provided strong evidence that verbal instructions -and hence cognitive expectancies -modulate the same responses as Pavlovian fear conditioning, indicating a critical role for instructions and higher order knowledge in shaping defensive responses.
Many researchers have since combined Cook and Harris's paradigms with new techniques to measure how instructed knowledge shapes fear and aversive learning. I will focus on the contribution of brain circuits to the two forms of instructed fear acquisition (see Ref. [12] for a review of instructed extinction and Ref. [13] for a review of behavioral studies of instructed fear). One central question guiding studies of instructed fear and instructed learning is whether instructions influence the neural systems that support Pavlovian fear conditioning, which include the amygdala, insula, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), orbitofrontal/ventromedial prefrontal cortex (OFC/VMPFC), and striatum (for meta-analyses and reviews, see Refs. [14] [15] [16] ). Each of these regions can be influenced by contingency instructions [2, 3, 16] . However, amygdala involvement and lateralization seem to depend on whether instructions are paired with experience. Instructed fear can influence left amygdala activation [2, 3, 17] , but findings suggest that the right amygdala requires actual reinforcement. For example, patients with unilateral temporal lobectomies show deficits in instructed fear (measured by startle potentiation) when lesions encompass left, but not right, amygdala [17] . Braem et al. [18 ] recently employed multivoxel pattern analyses to compare responses to instructed fear and instructed learning in the amygdala, insula, ACC, VMPFC, and superior frontal gyrus. Only the right amygdala discriminated between a purely instructed CS, and a CS that was instructed and paired with shocks, suggesting that this region was uniquely responsive to experience. The amygdala was notably absent in a meta-analysis that combined fMRI studies of instructed fear and instructed aversive learning [16] . However, if amygdala lateralization depends on whether instructions are paired with experience, a heterogeneous meta-analysis would not be expected to identify the region. I return to the question of laterality below (see 'Outstanding questions and concluding remarks').
These studies indicate that instructions influence fearrelevant defensive responses and the neural systems that support them, and point to potential hemispheric asymmetries in the amygdala. While powerful, most studies of instructed fear and instructed learning lack a key feature: The ability to pit instructions directly against associative learning and test for interactions. 3 Instructions might override or bias feedback-driven learning, learning might 122 Pain and aversive motivation proceed similarly independent of instructions, or the two factors might combine additively to shape responses. To resolve these alternatives, one must distinguish between the response to reinforcement and the response to instructions. This is possible in dynamic environments wherein instructions either contradict what is learned through experience or operate with a distinct timecourse.
One particularly effective approach is instructed reversal learning (see Figures 1 and 2 ).
Testing for interactions: instructed reversal learning
Instructed reversals test the flexibility of associations and whether instructions override associative learning. The
Instructed fear learning Atlas 123 Dissociating instructions and experience during reversal learning. (a) When instructions are delivered before reinforcement, one can dissociate the effects of instructions and learning within participants. Hypothetical expected value (EV) signals that respond only to instruction would reverse immediately with instruction (top plot), while value that updates only through association would reverse slowly based on reinforcement (bottom plot). We used a combined within-group and between-group design to isolate these two types of reversal learning [27] . An Uninstructed Group learned through association, while an Instructed Group was informed about contingencies and reversals. approach was introduced to fear conditioning by Wilson in 1968 [19] . After conditioning, Wilson informed subjects that contingencies had reversed. SCR reversed immediately upon instruction and remained elevated even without additional reinforcement. This provided evidence that even classically conditioned responses were highly malleable in the face of instructed knowledge. Instructed reversals have been employed to address a number of questions, including whether stimulus timing and reinforcement during acquisition influences sensitivity to instructed knowledge [20] , whether biologically prepared stimuli are impervious to instructions [21, 22 ], and whether conditioned responses show any maintenance of initial learning upon instructed reversal [23 ] . In all these investigations, SCR and/or other defensive responses (startle, pupil dilation, and facial electromyography [23 ] ) reversed immediately upon instruction with no influence of initial learning. This body of work demonstrates that defensive responses are highly malleable and illustrates the power of cognitive expectancy mediated by instructed knowledge.
Because most work on instructed fear and instructed learning has not distinguished between instructions and associative learning, an important outstanding question has been whether the neural circuits involved in aversive learning update with instructions in the face of dynamic reinforcement. Research on instructed reward learning in humans [24] [25] [26] suggests that the PFC can maintain instructions and modulate learning in the striatum. My colleagues and I [27] used instructed reversals to test whether similar interactions govern aversive reversal learning, which relies on some of the same learning systems, including the VMPFC/OFC, striatum, and amygdala [28] [29] [30] . Individuals underwent aversive reversal-learning in a combined within-subject and betweensubject design ( Figure 2 ) and we measured responses to unreinforced CSs during fMRI scanning. Differential SCRs reversed immediately upon instruction in an Instructed Group, replicating previous work. We also observed immediate reversals in the striatum, insula, ACC, and the VMPFC/OFC, and the strength of reversal in striatum and VMPFC/OFC correlated with dorsolateral PFC (DLPFC) activation during the presentation of verbal instructions. These instruction-dependent corticostriatal interactions replicate and extend findings from the appetitive domain [24] [25] [26] . Most notably, however, the right amygdala did not update immediately upon instruction. Instead, differential amygdala responses reversed after actual reinforcement [27], indicating that it was more responsive to experiential, rather than instructed, learning. Moreover, this failure to reverse with instructions was specific to the right amygdala, as shown by significant laterality effects in the amygdala (t (1,19) = 2.98, p < 0.01; not formally reported in our original publication [27] ). These standard approaches indicate that both instructions and learning are sufficient to modulate defensive responses and to modulate brain responses in learning-related circuits, with the exception of the amygdala. However, standard approaches cannot isolate the precise learning dynamics or fluctuating interactions between these sources of information. Here, computational models are essential as they can tease apart ongoing aspects of behavior and test formally for dissociations.
Computational models reveal how instructions shape dynamic learning
While the most common computational models of reinforcement learning are designed to capture purely experiential, or model-free, learning as a function of reinforcements in the environment (see Box 1), recent work has begun to consider how higher order knowledge can shape this learning. I will focus on work specifically examining the influence of verbal instructions, and address other forms of higher order (i.e. model-based) learning below. Research on instructed reward learning in humans suggests that the PFC maintains instructions and modulates striatal learning, either by abolishing prediction errors in the presence of veridical instructions [24] , or by biasing learning toward instructions when instructions and feedback are inconsistent [25] . To test whether similar interactions guide aversive learning, we adapted standard learning models and introduced an 'instructed reversal parameter ' [27] that tested how swiftly expected value (EV) reverses upon instruction (see Box 1). Model parameters were isolated by fitting models to SCR from both groups. Fitting models to SCR from the Uninstructed Group isolated pure feedback-driven associative learning because the group learned only via experience (Figure 2b) , while fitting to the Instructed Group isolated learning that updated upon instruction because SCR reversed immediately (Figure 2d ).
The striatum, OFC/VMPFC, ACC, and bilateral amygdala all tracked feedback-driven EV in the Uninstructed Group [27], consistent with prior work on aversive reversal learning in humans [28] (Figure 2c ). In the Instructed Group, we observed dissociations that paralleled the conclusions from our within-subjects analyses of instructed reversals: The OFC/VMPFC, striatum, insula, and ACC tracked EV that updated with instructions (Figure 2e ), while the bilateral amygdala correlated with feedback-driven EV (i.e. EV from fits to the Uninstructed Group; Figure 2c ). While significant voxelwise correlations with the feedback-driven signal were observed bilaterally in the amygdala [27], ROI-based analyses were only statistically significant in the right amygdala, and we observed marginal differences in a formal test of laterality, consistent with hemispheric asymmetries reviewed above. Dissociations in learning were also observed when we used a hybrid model [31] [32] [33] [34] that assumed that learning rates varied as a function of associability: The OFC and striatum tracked learning that updated with instruction (EV and prediction error in both regions), while the amygdala tracked feedback-driven associability [35] .
Animal models of higher order knowledge and model-based reversal learning
Work reviewed above capitalizes on humans' ability to update expectations in response to verbal instruction, and indicates that instructions update conditioned responses and most affective learning systems, with the exception of the amygdala and its potentially lateralized responses. Are interactions between instructed knowledge and experience, which rely on the use of language, unique to humans or do they depend on evolutionarily conserved mechanisms? Which circuits cause responses to update? To answer these questions mechanistically, we can consider animal models of affective learning. While we cannot use language to instruct animals about contingencies, studies of model-based learning provide valuable parallels. Model-based learning [36] [37] [38] refers to learning based on knowledge of higher-order structure and outcome identity, which allows for goal-directed, flexible planning. While a complete discussion of model-based learning is outside the scope of this review (see Refs. [37, 39] ) several groups have specifically considered the relationship between higher order knowledge and reversal learning. I will focus on the role of OFC and the amygdala, which both play important roles in reversal learning and showed dissociations in our work [27] .
Researchers have examined the dynamic interplay between the OFC and amygdala during reversal learning by measuring behavior as animals learn stimulus-outcome contingencies. For example, Morrison et al. [40] recorded from right OFC and right amygdala neurons while monkeys performed a reversal learning task in which cues predicted either juice rewards or aversive air-puffs. Immediately after reversal, amygdala neurons updated firing more quickly for aversive outcomes, whereas OFC neurons updated more quickly for rewards. After several trials, OFC neurons began coding outcomes before amygdala neurons, irrespective of valence. Thus, Pavlovian reversal learning involves dynamic interactions between amygdala and OFC that shift over the course of learning. This is consistent with findings that amygdala lesions impair or alter reversal learning [41, 42] and OFC value coding in primates [43] , rodents [44] , and humans [45] .
The interplay between the amygdala and OFC is also evident in serial reversal learning paradigms [42, 46 ,47] and tasks that use contextual cues to signal reversals [48 ] . When reversal learning is overtrained, the monkey's goal shifts from searching for a reward to identifying when the reversal occurred. This is referred to as a
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Box 1 Quantitative models of instructed reversal learning.
I REINFORCEMENT LEARNING: Quantitative reinforcement learning models measure learning and the development of expectations in dynamic environments [36, 78, 79] . These models are applied most often to reward learning, and meta-analyses of human imaging studies indicate that the OFC/VMPFC correlates with expected value (EV) [80, 81] while the striatum responds to expectancy violations, or prediction errors (PE) [81, 82] . Similar computations guide aversive learning [34, [82] [83] [84] [85] [86] , although the exact computations of each region and specificity to valence still provokes heated debates in the literature. The amygdala's contribution to aversive learning has been associated with EV [87] , PE [59, 76] , and associability [32, 34, 35, 75, 76 ] as well as model-based precision [60] . II MODELING INSTRUCTED REVERSALS: We introduced a new 'instructed reversal' parameter (r) to measure the extent to which two cues exchange expected value (EV) upon instruction [22 ,27,35] . This additional parameter can be computed using any model that predicts EV (e.g. standard Rescorla-Wagner models [88] and hybrid models [31, 34, 35] ). At the time of instruction, each cue's EV updates based on the following equations:
Thus, if r = 0, each cue (CS a or CS b ) retains its EV, whereas if r = 1, EV reverses upon instruction. Associative learning proceeds normally between instructions. Simulations using a model with a fixed learning rate (0.3), 50% reinforcement, and three instructed reversals are presented below.
Expected Value (EV)
Original cs+ 'learning set' or 'task set' [49] [50] [51] , and requires a representation of task structure, similar to model-based learning. Recent work suggests that this inferential process can be modeled within a Bayesian framework [46 ,52] and requires intact connections between prefrontal and inferior temporal cortices [47] . Monkeys with amygdala lesions and those with lesions to OFC and prefrontal areas that receive projections from the amygdala actually reverse more quickly than control monkeys [42, 46 ] , and performance errors are associated with reduced context coding in the amygdala [46 ] . Thus, although OFC might represent task structure when a task is well learned, the amygdala seems necessary for combining knowledge of task structure with actual experience to respond optimally to the environment [53] .
These findings are consistent with recent views that the OFC maintains a cognitive representation of task state [54, 55] . I argue that this representation can be acquired through experience in animals and model-based learning, or through verbal instruction in humans. OFC can then update value signals in downstream regions such as the striatum and amygdala through direct projections [56, 57] . But even after the task is well-learned, the amygdala plays a crucial role in mapping the current contingencies onto the task structure, that is combining associative learning with higher order knowledge [53] . This parallels our findings that the OFC, PFC, and striatum update with instruction, whereas the amygdala responds to aversive outcomes [27, 35] . The amygdala might provide a confirmation signal that redirects attention when a shock is experienced in the new context, consistent with models suggesting that the amygdala represents associability or uncertainty [34, 35, [58] [59] [60] [61] . Notably, we also observed instructed associability signals in the striatum, insula, and dorsomedial PFC [35] .
The coexistence of experiential and instructed or modelbased uncertainty after a task is well learned might permit arbitration between these parallel streams of information [62, 63] . We do not know whether the dissociations we saw in our paradigm would persist as individuals become aware of task structure because we only included three reversals, and subjects received veridical instructions immediately upon reversal. Prevost et al. [60] identified model-based precision signals in the right amygdala during a serial reversal task, in which they informed participants that reversals might occur but did not provide information about when they would occur. This should engage ongoing arbitration between model-based and model-free learning as subjects make ongoing inferences about task and outcome structure. Similarly, tasks that include instructions that are incompatible with experience (e.g. Ref.
[25]) may also engage more direct competition between instructed and experiential learning. Finally, other prefrontal regions are also likely to contribute to instructed and higher order learning, and some effects that have been attributed to the OFC may actually reflect fibers passing through OFC rather than OFC per se [64, 65] . For a complete review of circuits involved in various forms of reversal learning, see Ref. [66] .
Outstanding questions and concluding remarks
Several questions remain regarding the specific role of the amygdala in instructed aversive learning that I hope will be addressed in future studies. First, what guides the hemispheric asymmetries found in the amygdala? Is the right amygdala really impervious to instructions, and is the left amygdala really updating in purely instructed fear? Phelps and Olsson [67] hypothesized that instructed fear might be lateralized due to dedicated language representation in the left hemisphere. Parallel asymmetries have been observed in studies of contingency awareness [68, 69] : The left amygdala responds preferentially when subjects are aware of contingencies, whereas the right amygdala responds to stimuli presented outside of awareness. Interestingly, most evidence for experiential amygdala signals in primates was restricted to right amygdala, supporting the lateralization seen in instructed fear learning studies. Yet few primate studies actually include bilateral recordings or account for lesion laterality, so hemispheric specificity is somewhat unknown (cf [70] ). Some rodent models of fear [71] and pain [72, 73] have observed right lateralized amygdala responses, consistent with specialization to aversive outcomes. However, other studies have not found hemispheric asymmetries [74] , and we observed experiential learning signals bilaterally [27] , although effects were stronger in right amygdala. Studies must continue to measure responses bilaterally and formally test asymmetries to resolve these questions and determine specificity to instructions or learning.
A second set of questions concern the precise computations of the amygdala and other structures during aversive learning. Researchers continue to investigate the relationship between affective circuits and computations that guide dynamic reinforcement learning. Work reviewed above points to a key role for the amygdala in experiential learning, consistent with the notion that it represents associability [32, 34, 35, 75, 76] and allocates attention to the environment. Are these computations specific to aversive learning? We might have seen pure experiential signals in the amygdala because of its role in signaling threats; it is unknown how responses would differ in the context of rewards. Notably, most work on model-based learning in animals and humans 1) focuses on appetitive learning, and 2) measures performance in instrumental tasks. Although we see many similarities with instructed aversive learning, such as corticostriatal interactions that update with instructions, we must determine whether computations differ as a function of valence and task structure. As mentioned earlier, several studies have formally measured the effects of instruction on instrumental tasks in the appetitive domain. For example, Doll et al. [25, 26] measured the influence of veridical instructions and instructions that were slightly incompatible with outcomes on behavior in an instrumental reward task. Instructions amplified the influence of rule-consistent outcomes, and reduced the input of incongruent outcomes on learning. We do not yet know whether similar effects govern active avoidance. Importantly, it is not known whether the balance between instructions and experiential learning varies as a function of behavioral outcome. For example, findings and conclusions about amygdala associability are based on fitting a hybrid model to SCR [27, 34, 35, 58] , but studies that fit the same model to reaction time [60] and expectancy ratings [76] have come to different conclusions about the computations supported by the amygdala. Different outcomes are likely to have different dynamics and to be differentially influenced by higher order knowledge. For example, one clever study employed instructed reversals to study placebo effects on different outcomes [77] . Placebo effects on consciously observable outcomes (pain and motor performance in Parkinson's Disease) reversed upon instruction, whereas placebo effects on hormonal outcomes (cortisol and growth hormone) depended on conditioning. Understanding how instructions and learning shape different types of defensive responses and the neural systems that mediate effects is a critical direction for future work. Finally, cross-species differences in brain organization might influence whether animal models of higher order learning can inform studies of instructed learning in humans. Future work should consider this directly using paradigms that are identical in humans and animals.
In conclusion, instructed knowledge shapes fear-relevant defensive responses and updates dynamic signals in most learning circuits, while the amygdala responds to aversive outcomes themselves. Understanding the relationship between these processes can inform basic research in affective science and shed light on psychiatric conditions that might involve altered relationships between experience and higher order knowledge [66] [67] [68] . Many questions on the exact interplay between instructions and learning and their underlying circuitry remain unanswered, providing a fruitful area for continued research. 
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